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We argue that certain provisions of alliance treaties can signal credible commitments to a peaceful relationship
among members and establish institutional mechanisms that promote the settlement of disagreements through
peaceful negotiation. Nonaggression, peaceful dispute settlement, military institutionalization, and permanent
organization provisions should increase the duration of peace between alliance members; we test our hypotheses with
a duration model. The analysis generally supports our expectations except that alliances that create permanent
organizations, even those specifically established to arbitrate disagreements, are associated with shorter durations of
peace. We conclude with some implications of our argument for the study of military alliances and international
institutions more broadly.
Competing theoretical perspectives in the quan-titative study of conflict among allies predictthat intra-alliance conflict will be either more
or less prevalent, with empirical evidence in support of
each perspective. The inconsistency in both theory
and evidence may be a consequence of interstate con-
flict scholars primarily focusing on the deterrent prop-
erties of alliances through capability aggregation.1
Snyder (1997), espousing a realist theory of alliance
formation, explicitly states that the outward looking
nature of alliances makes alliances different than other
institutions. Such a perspective leaves little room for
placing alliances within the larger set of international
institutions as we think about international conflict
processes. With attention focused on the external
effects of alliances, it is not surprising that quantitative
studies of alliances and conflict have only begun to
examine the conflict process within alliances.
This gap in the alliance-conflict literature is par-
ticularly vexing because of the volume of theoretical
and qualitative work in international relations that
incorporates alliances into the broader institutional
picture. Building upon on the themes recognized by
diplomatic historians such as Schroeder (1976), these
scholars explicitly consider the formation and main-
tenance of international institutions (including alli-
ances) to address security concerns with fellow
members (e.g., Krebs 1999; Lake 1999; Weber 1997;
Weitsman 2004). Therefore, a more complete under-
standing of the relationship between alliances and
military conflict requires investigating whether or not
alliances that form are successful at maintaining peace.
We contribute to the literature on alliances and con-
flict by investigating the relationship between alliance
treaty obligations and the duration of peace (i.e., the
period of time between alliance formation and mili-
tary conflict) between signatories. In other words, our
argument concerns the extent to which alliances are
effective at reducing military conflict once they are
established.
As it turns out, many alliances incorporate insti-
tutional mechanisms designed to promote peace. We
argue that states design alliances in part to regulate
internal political dynamics and identify treaty provi-
sions that should lengthen the duration of peace.Mili-
tary alliances signal the parties’ commitment to peace
and often establish institutions that reduce the trans-
action costs of communicating private information
about capabilities or resolve. Specifically, four aspects
of military alliances are likely to contribute to the
1Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros (2006) is a notable exception.
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duration of peace between the members: (1) provi-
sions requiring states to refrain from aggressive action
directed toward other members, (2) a commitment to
resolving disagreements between the parties through
peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms, (3) institu-
tionalization of the military relationship between the
allies, and (4) establishment of permanent organiza-
tions. We develop testable hypotheses concerning
these characteristics and subject them to a systematic
empirical test on all allied dyads from 1815 to 2001.
The analysis provides strong support for three out
of four hypotheses. In particular, we find that prom-
ises of nonaggression, peaceful dispute settlement, and
institutionalization of military affairs between allies all
increase the duration of peace within an allied dyad
(pair of allied states). Interestingly, we find that alli-
ances formed in conjunction with permanent organi-
zations and alliances that establish organizations
whose purpose is to arbitrate disagreements among
the members are quicker to experience a severe mili-
tarized conflict. These basic results are confirmed
through additional analysis that controls for sample
selection bias through the formation of the alliance.
Therefore, our research demonstrates that mili-
tary alliances, when designed to signal a vow of peace
and reveal information that alleviates uncertainty
about military capabilities, are associated with pro-
longed periods of peace between the allies. However,
international organizations and arbitration commis-
sions, when created in conjunction with a military
alliance, are correlated with shorter durations until
serious militarized conflict among the allies. Policy-
makers that advocate forming international organiza-
tions to coordinate foreign policy among allies and
students of an institutionalist perspective in interna-
tional relations will find mixed support for their posi-
tion within the evidence we present. International
institutions are not always successful in managing
interstate conflict; different institutional mechanisms
appear to have different effects on the conflict
process.
Our paper proceeds with a concise discussion of
theoretical and empirical research about intra-alliance
conflict. Then we present a theoretical argument
about how military alliances can be designed to signal
commitments to peace among the allies and increase
the information exchange that bargaining models
suggest is critical for resolving disagreements short of
war. In the next section, we describe the research
design to test our hypotheses about the influence of
alliance characteristics on the duration of peace.
Finally, we discuss the results of our statistical models
and then conclude with some implications that this
research has for the study of alliances and interna-
tional institutions more broadly.
Conflict between Allies
Generally, the realist approach to international rela-
tions interprets military alliances and alignments as
attempts to reduce uncertainty about the coalitions
likely to form in the event of hostilities, and propo-
nents of balance of power theory argue that alliances
deter aggression on the part of potential adversaries
(e.g., Morgenthau 1967; Waltz 1979). In contrast,
others argue that military alliances provoke conflict by
heightening the security dilemma that arises when
states form alliances. By aggregating the individual
capabilities of their members, alliances exacerbate the
fears of nonallies. A potential adversary may counter-
act the initial alliance by forming a pact of its own
and/or increasing military arms, which leaves all
parties feeling less secure (e.g., Gibler and Vasquez
1998; Snyder 1984).
However, scholars also recognize the role that alli-
ances play in managing relationships between the
members (Cha 1999; Schweller 1998; Weitsman
2004).2 In other words, not all alliances are formed
solely to increase the power/security of the allies
against an external threat. One advantage of ponder-
ing the internal purpose of an alliance instead of the
external purpose (i.e., the information it provides to
nonallies) is the focus on alliances from an institution-
alist perspective. Military alliances are in fact institu-
tions, although they represent only one type of
security institution (Keohane 1984; Haftendorn,
Keohane, and Wallander 1999; Lake 1999; Weber
1997). An institutional perspective of alliances consid-
ers them a form of security cooperation that provides
more autonomy in foreign policy decision making
with relatively minimal maintenance costs. Somemili-
tary alliances may even serve as regimes that crystallize
norms and expectations of behavior among their
members (Duffield 1992).
Weitsman (2004) incorporates institutionalist
arguments into her theory about internal threats
among allies. Conflicts of interest between states are a
significant motivation for a type of alliance she calls
“tethering” in which states “attempt to conciliate an
2For example, the Triple alliance that tied Austria and Italy together
with Germany served “to manage the more deep-rooted rivalry of
Italy and Austria” and “is also the clearest instance of two enemies
becoming allies mainly in order to avoid going to war with each
other” (Schroeder 1976, 243).
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adversary through an alliance agreement” (21), and
such an alliance is likely to decrease the chances of war
by increasing transparency in the allies’ relationship.
Similarly, Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros (2006) suggest
that institutionalized alliances increase the knowledge
that allies have about each other’s military capabilities.
More information about an allies’ war-fighting capa-
bility should mitigate the fundamental problem of
uncertainty that bargaining theories of conflict
suggest lead to war (e.g., Fearon 1995; Morrow 1989;
Reed 2003).
In contrast, Bueno de Mesquita (1981) suggests
that his evidence that allies fight against one another
more often than nonallies is the result of anticipated
divergence away from the closeness in allies’ foreign
policy positions, which contributes to a positive
expected utility for war.3 However, the institutional
nature of alliances does not guarantee restraint from
militarized violence among the members. Among
highly institutionalized, multilateral alliances the
security provided to some members could paradoxi-
cally lead to a greater chance of intra-alliance conflict
because neutralizing the external threat allows
members to focus on secondary foreign policy con-
cerns (perhaps involving allies), improves military
capability to engage these secondary objectives, and
provides an additional forum and leverage with which
to challenge the status quo (Krebs 1999).
Unfortunately, the current empirical record does
not provide students of international relations much
in the way of a resolution to these competing claims.
Both qualitative and quantitative studies of alliances
and conflict provide inconsistent evidence. Tethering
alliances were only successful in two of the three pre-
WorldWar I cases examined by Weitsman (2004), and
even those that were successful “heightened uncer-
tainty and insecurity in the system” (171). Analysis of
the balance of power system in the late nineteenth
century confirms that alliance members were not
more likely to cooperate with one another than
nonallies (Healy and Stein 1973; McDonald and
Rosecrance 1985). While not formally allied, the rela-
tionship between Japan and South Korea may have
suffered as a result of having the United States as a
common ally in the post-WorldWar II era (Cha 1999).
In addition, quantitative studies of militarized
conflict often adopt the argument of Russett and
Oneal (2001) by including alliances in their analysis to
measure common security interests. The effect of a
military alliance on the probability of a Militarized
Interstate Dispute (MID) is often negative, but this
result is by no means universal and may depend spe-
cifically upon model specification (e.g., Bremer 1992;
Kimball 2006; Reed 2000). Bearce, Flanagan, and
Floros (2006) suggest that military alliances have been
utilized inappropriately as an indicator of “common
interests” between allies and find that the effect of
alliances on militarized conflict is conditional upon
the balance of power between the allies; alliance agree-
ments only deter conflict among allies as their power
approaches parity.
Thus, one observes contrary arguments and
inconsistent empirical evidence within scholarly
research about the connection between military alli-
ances and intra-alliance conflict. In the next section,
we suggest a solution to this theoretical and empirical
puzzle by examining the content of military alliance
treaties.
Designing Military Alliances
to Deter Intra-Alliance
Military Conflict
Many scholars examine the deterrence properties of
military alliances by assuming that allies promise mili-
tary support to each other in the event of conflict
(Morrow 1994, 2000; Smith 1995). While these
approaches often consider military alliances equiva-
lent documents in letter and spirit, we adopt the
approach of more recent work that argues the specific
content of alliance treaties matters (Bearce, Flanagan,
and Floros 2006; Leeds 2003a; Leeds and Anac 2005;
Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000; Weitsman 2004). Rec-
ognizing the multiple purposes of alliances is not only
consistent with more recent international relations
research, but conforms to historical interpretations of
the purpose and function of many interstate alliances
(Schroeder 1976) and coincides with arguments about
the purposeful design of international institutions to
achieve cooperation (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal
2001).4
3However, the propensity for war among allies is not much differ-
ent than the rate of war between nonallied states (Ray 1990).
4We adopt the definition of a military alliance specified by the
Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) project. The
ATOP project conceptualizes military alliances as “written agree-
ments, signed by official representatives of at least two indepen-
dent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of
military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to
refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/
cooperate in the event of international crises that create the poten-
tial for military conflict” (Leeds et al. 2002, 238).
allying for peace: treaty obligations and conflict between allies 1105
This content downloaded from 131.095.218.041 on December 13, 2016 07:21:52 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Consequently, we assume the specific content of
an alliance treaty corresponds to the goals that states
wish to achieve by forming a cooperative security
agreement with other states. Of course, maximizing
the chances of deterring or defeating a potential foe
can be one (or even the primary) purpose of a military
alliance, and we agree that certain obligations (e.g.,
military assistance or neutrality) are an attempt to
codify the behavior of alliance members in a written
agreement that will achieve this purpose (Fearon 1997;
Leeds 2003a). However, not all members of an alliance
seek security from the relationship; some members
may desire influence over the foreign policy of their
allies in exchange for security guarantees (Morrow
1991; Weitsman 2004).
Therefore, we argue that certain obligations
within military alliances may alleviate the security
dilemma between allies, reducing the chances of intra-
alliance conflict. Instead of inferring the motives of
states in forming an agreement by some other criteria
(e.g., public declarations upon signing, historical
evaluations, highest level of commitment), we believe
it is reasonable to presume that agreements are an
accurate reflection of the goal(s) of the alliance.5
Whether or not the goal of a military alliance is
achieved depends upon the partners fulfilling their
expected duties under the circumstances of the agree-
ment (Fearon 1997; Leeds 2003b; Leeds, Long, and
Mitchell 2000). For an alliance to be successful at
deterring intra-alliance conflict, we need information
about the rate of success for nonviolent (e.g., negotia-
tion) resolution of the allies’ disagreements. Lacking
systematic information about the resolution of dis-
agreements among alliance members, we suggest that
observing the extent to which alliance agreements
prolong peace among allies is a useful proxy. Each
moment of time after an agreement is signed and rati-
fied (if necessary) represents the “success” of the mili-
tary alliance in preventing conflict between the
members, so we consider the duration of peace
between the alliance members after they enter into an
agreement a suitable criterion for evaluating the effi-
cacy of military alliances concerning conflict preven-
tion. The arguments and hypotheses we develop in the
next section concerning the provisions of military alli-
ances are aligned with our argument that deterrence of
intra-alliance conflict succeeds as peace endures
between the members.
Commitments to Nonaggression and
the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
While alliance treaties should not be considered
unconditional commitments of military support for
allies in the event of conflict, alliances should be con-
sidered signals of the action (or inaction) that
members will undertake in the future. Different
signals are sent by the different types of commitments
to which states adhere. Moreover, in formalizing their
commitments states are sending costly signals about
their future behavior; cooperation can occur between
states without a formal agreement being negotiated,
signed, and ratified (Fearon 1997; Morrow 2000;
Smith 1995). Resources are consumed by the negotia-
tions of an agreement, and the formation of an alli-
ance requires that the state absorb some loss of
autonomy in future foreign policy behavior (Altfeld
1984; Morrow 1987, 1991).
Consequently, we consider promises of nonag-
gressive behavior by alliance members to be costly
signals of credible intentions about future behavior.
When a government ties its hands with respect to
future foreign policy behavior, it generates audience
costs to be paid if and when it breaks that commit-
ment (Fearon 1997). Audience costs arise through the
actions of domestic constituencies that punish leaders
for failing to honor their agreements or through the
reluctance of foreign leaders to make agreements with
an unreliable partner.
We interpret the inclusion of provisions in an alli-
ance treaty that specify the refusal to use force, aid an
ally’s enemies (external or internal), or interfere in the
domestic political affairs of one’s alliance partners in
the future as an attempt by leaders to signal their inter-
est in maintaining peace between the allies.6 Leaders
tie their hands in future foreign policy when they sign
a military alliance requiring the members abstain
from aggressive behavior toward other allies. In other
words, provisions forbidding aggressive action
included in military alliances should not be consid-
ered “cheap talk” by allies. If forming a nonaggression
pact were completely costless, all states would freely
enter, and violate, such contracts. Leaders should be
reluctant to constrain their future behavior, especially
if there are costs to pay for breaking a commitment.
5Leeds, Long, and Mitchell (2000) provide evidence that military
alliance members rarely take actions beyond what is required in
their agreements and fulfill their commitments about 75% of the
time.
6So-called “nonaggression pacts” are neither ubiquitous nor
unusual to find in military alliance treaties. In 648 alliances iden-
tified by the ATOP project spanning the years 1816–2003, 17% of
the alliances identified do not include any other obligations
besides a commitment to nonaggression.
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Our first hypothesis predicts that commitments
requiring states to reject aggressive behavior against
alliance members will keep the peace because, ceteris
paribus, breaking such an agreement is costly:
H1: Military alliances that include commitments to
refrain from aggressive behavior will increase the
duration of peace between the allies.
In addition, some military alliances explicitly
require that any disputes arising between the alliance
members will be settled through peaceful mecha-
nisms.7 Provisions calling for nonviolent dispute reso-
lution are not rare in alliance treaties. Within the
ATOP alliance dataset, 119 (18%) of the treaties
include provisions for the use of mediation or arbitra-
tion to adjudicate disputes between the alliance part-
ners and 174 (28%) include promises to settle disputes
exclusively by peaceful means.
Consequently, we suggest that proposals for
peaceful methods of dispute resolution such as media-
tion or arbitration are an additional mechanism by
which states can send costly signals about their inten-
tions. Governments that form agreements requiring
peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms should be
likely to adhere to their commitments, which will
prolong peace among the alliance members.
H2: Military alliances that include commitments by
the members to resolve disputes peacefully will
increase the duration of peace between the
allies.
These characteristics of military alliances are
mechanisms by which the parties formalize their
intentions concerning future behavior toward one
another. In the next section, we argue that two other
characteristics of military alliances mitigate asymmet-
ric information problems that may lead states to
choose war over a negotiated settlement.
Military Institutionalization and
Permanent Organizations
Bargaining models of war have provided a wealth of
insights to scholars of international conflict. Fearon
(1995) explains how rational actors can fail to negoti-
ate resolutions to conflict even though such failure
(i.e., war) is inefficient because both sides prefer to
avoid the costs of war. While Fearon identifies issue
indivisibilities, commitment problems, and private
information about military capabilities or resolve as
three mechanisms that could contribute to bargaining
failures, it is the latter two problems that we argue
specific characteristics of military alliances can influ-
ence.8 Private information about the true military
capabilities or resolve of each state can be withheld by
the actors in order to negotiate a more favorable deal.
In other words, actors have incentives to misrepresent
their real capabilities or resolve and cannot credibly
communicate their situation. The uncertainty that is
created by private information increases the difficulty
of finding an acceptable solution, and thus increases
the chance that states will resort to military force to
resolve their differences (Reed 2003). Commitment
problems arise when the parties have sufficient incen-
tive to break their commitments after an agreement is
reached. The prospect of a better bargaining position
in the future, and thus a more favorable settlement,
can derail an agreement. We argue that military alli-
ances can alleviate the uncertainty of bargaining
situations through two characteristics; military
institutionalization and the creation of permanent
organizations.
First, alliance treaties that establish greater levels
of military cooperation may have the effect of reveal-
ing private information about each side’s capabilities
in a military contest (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros
2006; Weitsman 2004). By creating formal procedures
and structures that require the militaries of each state
to coordinate their activities, actors may indirectly
alleviate the asymmetric information problem that
bargaining theory suggests is critical in preventing
states from creating a peaceful resolution.Military alli-
ances that establish higher levels of military institu-
tionalization should be more effective at revealing the
private capabilities of their members than agreements
that do not include these provisions. Alliance agree-
ments that include provisions for communication
between the armed services of the members, establish
joint command structures for the militaries of the
states, and/or create institutions whose purpose is to
coordinate defense and security policies should miti-
gate informational problems that contribute to bar-
gaining failures.7For example, Article V of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between
Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 declared that, “Should
disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties
over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle
these disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of
opinion or, if necessary, through the establishment of arbitration
commissions” (Grenville 1987).
8Powell demonstrates that issue indivisibilities “do not offer a dis-
tinct solution to the inefficiency puzzle and should really be seen as
commitment problems” (2006, 170).
allying for peace: treaty obligations and conflict between allies 1107
This content downloaded from 131.095.218.041 on December 13, 2016 07:21:52 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
As a result, military alliances that incorporate
more military institutionalization features should be
more successful at prolonging peace. The third
hypothesis we propose is:
H3: Military alliances that incorporate a higher
degree of military institutionalization among the
members will increase the duration of peace
between the allies.
In addition to military institutionalization within
alliance treaties, the creation of permanent organiza-
tions (with standing committees and bureaucracies)
can also alleviate informational problems that lead to
bargaining failures when uncertainty about the bar-
gainers’ resolve or commitment problems are present.
Military alliances that are created as part of or in con-
junction with independent organizations that have a
permanent bureaucracy can reduce asymmetric infor-
mation problems. States institutionalize their relation-
ships at the international level to promote cooperation
when the risks from a failure to collaborate outweigh
the costs (loss of autonomous decision making) of a
commitment (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Lake 1999;
Weber 1997). In other words, international organiza-
tions provide a cooperative structure that enhances
the likelihood of acquiring the benefits of cooperation.
A permanent organization will provide informa-
tion to the members about the extent to which each of
them is abiding by the agreement and working toward
the common goals of the organization. One feature of
international institutions is that they centralize
information-gathering authority, allowing coopera-
tion through organizations to be more effective than
decentralized bargaining by reducing the noise that
increases uncertainty about states’ motives (Kore-
menos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001).Organizations with a
permanent presence also increase the interactions of
the members, lengthening the shadow of the future
and providing a forum where states can negotiate
solutions to their differences using side payments
(Axelrod 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Keohane
1984). Permanent organizations may even be able to
act as guarantors of negotiated solutions to differences
among the allies, alleviating commitment problems,
or “act as information arbitrageurs, reducing the risk
of war by revealing private information about strategic
variables” (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004,
12).9
The efficacy of international organizations in
reducing conflict among their members could be
contingent upon the institutional structure of the
organization. Specifically, empirical research on
international organizations shows that a higher degree
of institutionalization in the organization reduces the
chances of conflict between states (Boehmer, Gartzke,
and Nordstrom 2004, 12). If organizations facilitate
the negotiation of bargaining solutions, military alli-
ances that establish permanent organizations with
standing bureaucracies as part of the agreement
should facilitate peace among the alliance members.
We hypothesize that a standing organization with a
permanent presence that is created as part of an alli-
ance will have a similar effect on the alliance members’
ability to successfully maintain peace between one
another:
H4: Military alliances that establish permanent
organizations will increase the duration of peace
between the allies.
Military institutionalization and permanent orga-
nizational structures can also alleviate the difficulty of
managing conflicts among the allies. Therefore, we
expect to find that these characteristics are associated
with longer periods of peace among the members. The
next section explains the empirical investigation that
we conduct to evaluate our expectations.
Research Design
The unit of analysis we observe to test our hypotheses
is the dyad-year; a dyad consists of a pair of states that
are both members of the interstate system according
to the Correlates of War (COW) project.10 We restrict
our sample to include only dyad-years in which the
states were joint members of at least one military alli-
ance in version 3.0 of the ATOP data set. Thus, while
the data set covers the temporal range of 1816–2001,
observations are only included in the sample if the
states are allies (i.e., nonallied dyad years are
excluded).Although states only need to bemembers of
one alliance to be included in the sample, some dyads
have multiple alliance relationships in force at the
same point in time. Therefore, we construct our inde-
9Alliances that establish organizations should be more likely to
overcome the enforcement problems that plague international
cooperation generally; a successful bargain over the creation of the
organization has been already been reached (Fearon 1998).
Empirically, this means that military alliances that incorporate
organizations, or other institutional characteristics, may be non-
random.We address this issue in the research design section of our
paper.
10See Small and Singer (1982) for the criteria that determine
system membership, an updated version of the data is provided by
the Correlates of War Project (2005).
1108 andrew g. long, timothy nordstrom, and kyeonghi baek
This content downloaded from 131.095.218.041 on December 13, 2016 07:21:52 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
pendent variables about the nature of the allied dyad
by utilizing all of the relevant obligations in force
between the members, even if the provisions are con-
tained in different alliance treaties.11 Thus, an ATOP
alliance creates an allied dyad (or set of allied dyads if
the alliance includes three or more members) by
matching distinct pairwise combinations of states that
are members of the alliance.12
Data and Variables
The dependent variable for our analysis records the
length of time (in years) that the states are allied before
the occurrence of a militarized conflict. Each episode
is a set of allied-dyad years with the first year of the
alliance recording the beginning of the episode and
one of two events marking the end: (1) the allied status
of the dyad ends, but no militarized conflict between
the pair of states has occurred, or (2) failure occurs.13
We record a failure when a militarized conflict in
which both sides use military force against each other
occurs between the allies. Data on militarized conflicts
is acquired from version 2.0 of the dyadic MID data
(Maoz 2005). Once a dyadic MID in which both sides
use force occurs, the allied dyad is dropped from the
sample regardless of whether the alliance continues in
force. If the alliance between the states ends, the same
dyad can reenter the sample at a later time if the states
enter a new military alliance. That is, the same dyad
can be observed in multiple episodes if it is allied for a
period of time, then unallied, and then allied again
over the entire temporal range of the sample. For
example, the history of the United Kingdom-France
dyad from 1816 to 2001 consists of eight separate epi-
sodes, the first begins in 1827 when the states become
allies and the last ends in 2001 when the sample ends
with the United Kingdom and France remaining allies.
To test our hypotheses, we create independent
variables from the detailed information about each
military alliance’s characteristics provided in the
ATOP data set (version 3.0).14 First, we create a vari-
able that measures the prohibition of aggressive activ-
ity by one member against another. This variable,
Nonaggression, combines three different characteris-
tics of a military alliance: (1) whether the alliance
includes an explicit obligation to refrain from the use
of force to settle disputes, (2) whether the alliance
forbids members from aiding the enemies (internal or
external) of the other members, and (3) whether the
allies promise not to interfere in the domestic affairs of
one another. The Nonaggression variable is coded as
the sum of the total number of these characteristics
included in a military alliance treaty and ranges from
a value of 0 (if none of the conditions hold) to 3 (if all
three conditions hold). As the level of commitment to
nonaggression increases, the duration between alli-
ance formation and a MID in which both sides use
military force should increase.
Second, we create a dichotomous variable coded 1
(0 otherwise) when the alliance includes a provision
requiring the members to utilize dispute settlement
procedures such as mediation or arbitration. The
Mediate Disputes variable should lengthen the dura-
tion of peace after alliance formation.
Third, we measure the level of military institu-
tionalization within the military alliance. Three provi-
sions of military cooperation are recorded by the
measure: (1) whether the alliance requires cooperation
between the military forces of allies during peacetime,
(2) whether the alliance establishes an integrated mili-
tary command structure, and (3) whether the alliance
requires that the parties establish an organization to
facilitate military cooperation, such as a defense policy
commission. This variable, Military Institutionaliza-
tion, is a summary variable recording how many of
11While we could also construct a data set that distinguishes
between allied-dyads based on distinct alliance agreements
between the same pairs of states (if multiple alliances are in force
at the same time), we examine all alliances in force between a pair
of states simultaneously because multiple alliance agreements
between the same pair of states are not independent of one
another.
12In some military alliances, members commit to different obliga-
tions toward different members. We utilize the ATOP dyad-year
alliance data which adjusts multilateral alliances to account for
differences in obligations made between individual members. See
the ATOP codebook (Leeds 2005) for more information at http://
atop.rice.edu/.
13The end of the alliance relationship within a dyad occurs when a
dyad no longer has any alliance agreement in force and can occur
through termination of all agreements or loss of system member-
ship by one of the parties (Leeds 2005). These cases are right-
censored along with each of the cases in which an alliance is still in
force at the end of the time period for the sample, but where failure
has not occurred.
14The data of Singer and Small (1966) and those that have updated
their initial collection on alliances classifies agreements in a mutu-
ally exclusive, three-category typology; Type I agreements are
defense pacts, Type II agreements are neutrality/nonaggression
pacts, and Type III agreements are ententes. Utilizing the Singer-
Small typology would require that we ignore agreements that
include provisions designed to promote peace among the
members (if the agreement includes a nonaggression provision in
addition to a defense provision) or include agreements that
promise neutrality, which is different from nonaggression (Leeds
2005). Therefore, we believe that the more detailed information
available in the ATOP project on alliances is a superior source of
data for testing our argument.
allying for peace: treaty obligations and conflict between allies 1109
This content downloaded from 131.095.218.041 on December 13, 2016 07:21:52 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
these provisions are part of the alliance treaty and
ranges from 0 (no military institutionalization) to 3
(peacetime cooperation between military forces, inte-
grated command, and a military cooperation commis-
sion). We expect that greater degrees of military
institutionalization will increase the duration between
formation of the alliance and a seriousMIDwithin the
dyad.
Finally, we code two dichotomous variables to
capture the establishment of permanent organizations
as part of the military alliance. The first,Organization,
is coded 1 if the alliance establishes “a stand-alone
organization with a permanent bureaucracy” (0 oth-
erwise) and the second, Arbitration Commission, is
coded 1 if the military alliance creates an organization
for the sole purpose of resolving disputes between the
members (Leeds 2005). Both of these independent
variables should increase the duration of peace.
In addition to the variables that we utilize to test
our hypotheses, we include standard control variables
that are important correlates of militarized conflict.
Specifically, we include a dichotomous measure,
Shared Border, coded 1 for the existence of a shared
land border between the states (0 otherwise). We
expect states that share territorial borders will experi-
ence shorter durations of peace because conflict is
more likely between territorial neighbors (Vasquez
1993). We also include two variables that capture the
power of the states in the dyad. First, we code a
dichotomous variable,Major Power, coded 1 (0 other-
wise) if either of the states, or both, are considered
major powers in the COW interstate system. The rela-
tive power of the states in the dyad is also included as
a control variable, measured by a ratio of the larger
state’s power to the combined power of both states in
the dyad (Bennett and Stam 2000a). In our model,
Relative Capabilitiesmeasures the relative power of the
states in the dyad based on the COW dataset of
national capabilities for each state (Singer, Bremer,
and Stuckey 1972).15 Major powers have global inter-
ests and the ability to pursue those interests, so we
expect that allies will experience a shorter duration of
peace when major powers are part of the agreement.
On the other hand, as the relative power in a dyad
increases, the duration of peace should be longer
because uncertainty over capabilities decreases (Reed
2003).
A number of scholars have demonstrated the pro-
pensity of democratic states to refrain from fighting
with one another (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993). We
insert a dichotomous variable, Joint Democracy, coded
1 (0 otherwise) when the difference between the states’
democracy and autocracy scores is 6 or higher in the
Polity IV dataset to account for differences in the con-
flict behavior of regime types (Marshall and Jaggers
2000). In addition to regime type similarity, common
foreign policy interests among states should reduce the
likelihood of militarized interstate conflict.We include
a variable, Similarity, to measure the commonality of
foreign policy interests within a dyad using the global,
weighted Similarity score for the dyad (Signorino and
Ritter 1999). Both Joint Democracy and Similarity
should increase the duration of peace.We also control
for whether or not an alliance is formed during
wartime. Wartime Alliance is a dichotomous variable
coded 1 (0 otherwise) if either state in the dyad is
involved in a COW interstate war at the time the alli-
ance is formed (Small and Singer 1982). Alliances
formed during wartime may be designed for the
purpose of prosecuting the immediate war and their
duration may be shorter on average, ceteris paribus, if
the end of a war coincides with the end of the alli-
ance’s purpose.We expectWartime Alliance to be asso-
ciated with a shorter duration of peace.
Statistical Estimation
We estimate two statistical models to test our four
hypotheses. The first model is estimated using the Cox
proportional hazards technique. Because our sample
includes information on an allied dyad over time
(allied dyad-years), we are incorporating time-varying
covariates in the analysis. The independent variables
will change over time if a dyad is already allied and
forms a military alliance with additional obligations
that were not part of the original alliance relationship.
Also, in a small number of alliances the parties termi-
nate certain obligations while remaining party to the
alliance as a whole. In these instances, our key inde-
pendent variables may also change over time. In addi-
tion, variables like Shared Border, Major Power,
Relative Capabilities, Joint Democracy, and Similarity
may also vary over time.
Unlike the more commonly used Weibull model,
the Cox proportional hazards model does not require
that the functional form of the hazard rate be specified
a priori. Instead, the hazard rate is determined by the
model itself. Given that we have no strong theoretical
expectation that the hazard rate should follow a
Weibull, Exponential, or any other functional form,we
feel the Cox model is more appropriate.
15We use EUGene (http://eugenesoftware.org/) to create the con-
tiguity, major power, relative capabilities, similarity, and joint
democracy variables (Bennett and Stam 2000b).
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In the second model, we utilize an estimation
technique that allows us to control for nonrandom
sample selection bias because military allies may be
less likely to experience serious militarized conflict
(and thus, more likely to experience a longer duration
between the formation of the agreement and a serious
MID) than nonallies. If the data-generation process
that leads to the formation of an alliance (or an alli-
ance with particular characteristics) is nonrandom,
sample selection may bias the coefficients of the dura-
tion model. The time until a serious dispute occurs
between the parties may be longer not because of the
alliances’ provisions, but because the parties to the
alliance will experience a longer baseline duration
until conflict due to their common interests in
forming the alliance in the first place. Our primary
purpose is to test the effects of different types of alli-
ances on the duration of peace after the alliance is
formed, so selection effects may not be critical to our
empirical analysis.16 Nevertheless, we also estimate a
two-stage model that controls for selection developed
by Boehmke, Morey, and Shannon (2006).
In this second model, the first equation estimates
the probability that an alliance will form between a
pair of states. A random sample of 58,108 nonallied
dyad-years is drawn from all dyads from 1816 to 2001
and combined with 3,056 allied dyad-years.17 The
dependent variable is coded 1 in the initial year of the
alliance (0 otherwise). To predict the formation of an
alliance, we include variables measuring the similarity
of the regime types of the states (Polity), whether or
not one of the states in the dyad is a major power
(Major Power), the geographic distance between the
states in miles (Distance), the lag of the International
Interaction Score (IIS) of the states, whether or not the
states are strategic rivals with one another (Strategic
Rivalry), the foreign policy similarity of the states
(Similarity), the level of external threat facing the dyad
(External Threat), and the number of allies of each
state in the dyad (Allies i and Allies j).18 Other scholars
have demonstrated that similarity in domestic regime
type, major power status, and the level of external
threat should increase the probability of alliance for-
mation while the distance between states, a history of
hostile interactions (IIS), and the number of allies for
each state should decrease the probability of alliance
formation (Gibler and Wolford 2006; Kimball 2006;
Lai and Reiter 2000; Siverson and Emmons 1991). We
include a variable for strategic rivalry to measure the
extent to which states may be more likely to form an
alliance in order to exercise control over their per-
ceived enemies (Weitsman 2004).
Each of the independent variables from the first
model is included in the second-stage duration of
peace equation where the dependent variable is the
time until a MID in which both allies use force against
each other. Based on our initial analysis of the Cox
proportional hazards model, we assume aWeibull dis-
tribution for the duration equation (i.e., the hazard
rate is nonconstant over time). Unlike our initial
model, the two-stage model does not allow for time-
varying covariates, so the independent variables are
constructed by combining the information across
allied dyad-years into a single observation for the
allied-dyad’s entire history. If an allied dyad experi-
ences any of the provisions we designate to test our
hypotheses during the time in which it is allied, the
independent variable is coded positively to reflect that
provision. We include the mean of the relative capa-
bilities and similarity of foreign policy interests of the
dyad in the duration equation to measure the average
of these characteristics over the duration of the mili-
16To elaborate, our argument specifies that differences across par-
ticular alliances will affect the duration until a seriousMID occurs.
The most appropriate correction for selection bias would guard
against selection into alliances with the specific characteristics that
are likely to lead to a longer peace. At this time we are not able to
methodologically control for selection into particular types of
military alliances or agreements that contain multiple specific pro-
visions. Nevertheless, the selection-duration model developed by
Boehmke, Morey, and Shannon (2006) does allow us to adjust the
model for selection bias based on the formation of any alliance.
17Our attempts to estimate the selection-duration model on the
full sample of all dyads from 1816 to 2001 were unsuccessful. The
model failed to converge on a set of coefficients that maximize the
likelihood function. We drew a number of random samples of
nonallied dyads and find consistent results across all samples.
Thus, our results are not driven by the particular set of nonallied
dyads that produced the model in Table 2.
18Polity is coded as the absolute value of the difference in the
democracy minus autocracy scores for each state and ranges from
0 to 20 (Marshall and Jaggers 2000), with higher values on the
variable recording greater dissimilarity in regime type. Distance is
the capital to capital distance between the states generated by the
EUGene software program (Bennett and Stam 2000b). The Inter-
national Interaction Score of the dyad accounts for past militarized
conflicts in the history of the dyad (Crescenzi and Enterline 2001)
and ranges from –1 to 0. Strategic rivalry is a dichotomous variable
that captures whether the states in the dyad are strategic rivals
according to Thompson (2001). External threat is measured as the
sum of the COWnational capabilities for all states in the politically
relevant international environment of each state, excluding states
that are allies and have a foreign policy similarity greater than the
median value of the population. We include the average of the
external threat faced by the states in the dyad. Leeds and Savun
(2007) discuss the operationalization of this variable in more
detail. The major power and similarity variables are identical to
those described above, and the total number of allies each state has
is a simple count of the number of dyadic alliances each state has
in a given year.
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tary alliance and code the dichotomous control vari-
ables positive if they are positive at any time for the
episode.
Results
Table 1 presents the results of the Cox Proportional
Hazards analysis. There are 3,695 episodes and 135
end in failure; a rate of conflict among allied-dyads
that is approximately 3.5%. Before discussing the indi-
vidual variables, we note that Schoenfeld residual tests
show the null hypothesis of proportional hazards
cannot be rejected.19 This result holds for both the
entire model and for each of the individual indepen-
dent variables. Because each variable captured some
mechanism that should help promote peace within an
alliance, our theoretical expectations were that the
presence of each key independent variable would
decrease the hazard rate. The estimates in Table 1
provide direct support for Hypotheses 1 and 3; the
variables for nonaggression and military institutional-
ization are negative and significant. Upon taking into
account potential multicollinearity among the vari-
ables measuring alliance commitments, we also find
support for Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, the coef-
ficients of the variables that test Hypothesis 4 are in
the opposite direction to our expectations.
Specifically, the results show that nonaggression
commitments decrease the hazard rate among allied-
dyads. Levy (1981) argues that nonaggression treaties,
such as the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, are signed by
countries that have a high chance of fighting one
another (Levy 1981). While we account for alliance
treaties that incorporate additional nonaggression
promises beyond the obligation to refrain from using
force against an ally, this result suggests that states
incorporate nonaggression provisions into their alli-
ance treaties and live up to the promise. Alliances that
call for substantial integration of the militaries’ of
each member also prolong the duration of peace
between the allies. It appears as though alliances may
gain in two ways from military institutionalization.
The joining together of militaries could signal to an
external rival that the allies are committed to one
another, and our results show that institutionalization
19Specifically, none of the Schoenfeld scaled residuals achieve sta-
tistical significance for any of the independent variables and the
global test produces a chi-square value of 6.81 (11 df, p < .81).
TABLE 1 Effects of Alliance Provisions and Obligations on Time Until First Dispute
Cox Proportional Hazards Model with Time-Varying Covariates
Coefficient Std. Error % D in h(t)
Independent Variables
Arbitration Commission 1.306* .314 269.14%
Organization .353 .283 42.33%
Non-aggression -.463* .145 -37.06%
Mediate Disputes -.367 .296 -30.72%
Military Institutionalization -.373* .171 -31.13%
Control Variables
Relative Capabilities -1.431* .663 -19.89%
Shared Border 1.931* .203 589.64%
Joint Democracy -.987* .377 -62.73%
Similarity -.284 .333 -8.35%
Wartime Alliance -.359 .428 -5.38%
Major Power 1.137* .279 41.77%
Number of Episodes 3,695
Number of Failures 135
Number of Observations 57,819
Chi-square 420.05*
* = p < .05 in two-tailed tests of statistical significance.
Note: Cox proportional hazards model using the Breslow method for ties and clustered on episode.
Substantive effects (the change in the hazard rate) in the third column are calculated as eb - 1 for a one unit change in dichotomous (or
categorical) variables and e(b*sd) - 1 where sd is a change of one standard deviation in the Relative Capabilities and Similarity variables.
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of the militaries makes it less likely that the allies will
have disputes among themselves. Moreover, our find-
ings represent a more general result than previous
research on military institutionalization, which sug-
gested that the effects of alliances on intra-alliance
conflict were conditional on the balance of power
between the allies (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006).
The standard error for the coefficient of the
mediation variable is larger than allowable for conven-
tional levels of statistical significance. However, the
variables for mediation, organization, and nonaggres-
sion are correlated between .5 and .8 in our sample.
Thus, multicollinearity may have produced inflated
standard errors for the mediation variable (as well as
for the organization variable, which we discuss below).
Results of a joint F-test suggest that we can reject the
null hypothesis that the coefficients for the mediation,
organization, and nonaggression variables are all equal
to zero (chi-square = 12.89, p < .01). Given that the
coefficient is negative, we conclude that alliances
calling for problems to be solved via negotiation help
promote peace between alliance members.
Interestingly, both of the variables used to test
Hypothesis 4 have a relationship to the duration of
peace that is counter to our expectations. As was men-
tioned above, the arbitration commission variable
marks those alliances that call for a permanent (insti-
tutionalized) arbitration panel. Arbitration commis-
sion is statistically significant, but has a positive
coefficient. The organization variable is positive but
fails to achieve statistical significance, but as with the
mediation variable, is shown to be contributing to the
model via a joint F-test. These results are counterin-
tuitive according to arguments that political institu-
tions accompanying military alliances reduce the
chances of intra-alliance conflict.20 Instead, Krebs’s
(1999) realist-institutionalist argument about military
alliances is partially supported by our results; some
forms of institutionalization (permanent organiza-
tions) make militarized conflict among allies more
likely in our sample.
We provide the substantive effects of alliance pro-
visions on the duration of peace in the form of the
percentage change in the hazard rate, also shown in
Table 1. In addition to the substantive changes to the
hazard rate, we also display the effects of the alliance
characteristics that are statistically significant in
Figures 1–3. The figures demonstrate the effects of
alliance provisions by graphing the survivor functions
for each value of the alliance variables when all other
variables are set at their modal or mean values. The
survivor function conveys the probability (on the
y-axis) that a subject’s survival time (T) is equal to or
greater than time (t) in years (on the x-axis). First, a
one-unit change in the nonaggression variable (e.g.,
from no obligations concerning nonaggression to one
obligation) results in a 37% decrease in the hazard
rate. Further calculation shows that the addition of all
three obligations barring aggressive behavior by allies
results in a decrease in the hazard rate of 75%. As
Figure 1 demonstrates visually, including a greater
number of nonaggression obligations increases the
probability of survival for an allied dyad.
Second, a one-unit increase in the military insti-
tutionalization variable produces a 31% decrease in
20As a means of checking the robustness of the findings in Table 1,
we estimated models that included separate variables for each of
the provisions in the nonaggression and military institutionaliza-
tion scales. The results for these models upheld the findings of the
general model, with F-tests of joint statistical significance confirm-
ing our expectations when multicollinearity was a problem. These
models along with additional analysis not reported here appear in
the online appendix available at http://www.journalofpolitics.org.
FIGURE 1 Survivor Functions by Nonaggression
FIGURE 2 Survivor Functions by Military
Institutionalization
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the hazard rate. Alliance partners that maximize this
element of treaty design by including all three ele-
ments of military institutionalization experience, on
average, a 67% decrease in the hazard rate. Figure 2
demonstrates the effects of increasing the number of
military institutionalization obligations on the prob-
ability of survival by an allied dyad, with the probabil-
ity of survival increasing with each additional
provision.
Third, the arbitration commission variable has the
largest substantive effect: those alliances that include a
permanent arbitration commission experience an
increase in the hazard rate of over 250%. In Figure 3,
we plot the survival rates of allied dyads that include a
provision creating an arbitration mechanism to
resolve disputes between the members of the alliance
versus those that eschew such an obligation. The influ-
ence of arbitration commissions has the most visually
remarkable of all the alliance obligation variables, with
the probability of survival falling below .8 just before
60 years when an arbitration commission is estab-
lished by the agreement.
Finally, the mediation and organization variables
affect the hazard rate in different directions; organiza-
tion increases the hazard of failure (militarized con-
flict) for an allied dyad by 42%, but the mediate
disputes variable decreases the hazard rate by about
30%.
Further, the effects of the control variables in
Table 1 are in line with the quantitative literature on
international conflict. Territorial contiguity has the
strongest effect of all the variables in the model. A
dyad with a shared border is often far more likely to
experience military conflict than noncontiguous states
and the results here support that notion. Our results
show that dyads with a shared border experience a
substantial increase in the hazard rate (almost 600%).
The results are also consistent with the conflict litera-
ture for joint democracy and relative capabilities. For
the former, two democratic allies will exhibit a 62%
decrease in the hazard rate, while an increase of one
standard deviation in the relative capabilities variable
results in a 20% decrease in the hazard rate. Wartime
alliances and alliance portfolio similarity have no sig-
nificant effect on the duration of peace, but alliances
that include at least one major power experience a
hazard of failure 41% greater than alliances without
major powers.
Table 2 contains estimates of a two-stage model
with the second stage estimated as a duration process
with a Weibull specification.21 The first stage of the
model is meant to control for the possibility that alli-
ances are not formed randomly.We based the selection
stage on the alliance formation literature that argues
alliances are more likely to form because of regime and
foreign policy similarity, geographical proximity, the
major power status of the members, the external
threat faced by the dyad, and a desire to reduce conflict
between the potential allies. Past hostility between
states and a larger set of allies for each state should
signal less likelihood of alliance formation. Although
this is not the focus of our analysis, it is important to
note that all the coefficients are significant and exhibit
the correct signs except for the number of allies for
each dyad member. The two variables capturing past
conflict and involvement in a strategic rivalry have
opposite signs. In support for the tethering argument
made by Weitsman (2004), strategic rivals are more
likely to form alliances, but those dyads with a dispute-
prone past are less likely to ally with one another
according to the coefficient for the International Inter-
action score.
With respect to the duration stage, the results are
similar to those in Table 1. Thus, our findings are
robust even when controlling for the possibility that
the alliance dyads in the selection model are not a
random sample. Hypotheses 1–3 are supported by the
analysis; the variables measuring the presence
of nonaggression and military institutionalization
obligations are significant and negative. Once again,
multicollinearity among the organization, nonaggres-
sion, and mediation variables is present within our
sample (.7 or higher), and a joint F-test of the hypoth-
esis that all three variables are equal to zero can be
rejected (chi-square = 31.68, p < .000). Hypothesis 4
21The error correlation variable, rho, is significant, indicating the
process of selecting into an alliance and the process of then expe-
riencing a militarized dispute are not independent of one another.
FIGURE 3 Survivor Functions by Arbitration
Commission
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again receives no support; Table 2 shows that both of
the variables testing the organizational hypothesis are
positive and significant, indicating that they increase
the hazard rate. In the conclusion below, we review the
contributions of the paper and assess the implications
for international relations research more generally.
Conclusion
Our research supports the claim that military alliances
have consequences beyond the traditional view of
capability aggregation for deterrence (Krebs 1999;
Weitsman 2004). Four hypotheses are generated from
our argument and tested to determine which aspects
of alliance treaties hold up against the historical record
on intra-alliance disputes; the results generally
support the idea that conflicts between allies are less
likely to emerge when mechanisms to signal peaceful
intentions and increase transparency are incorporated
into an alliance treaty. Our finding that military insti-
tutionalization increases the duration of peace sup-
ports evidence in previous studies (Bearce, Flanagan,
and Floros 2006; Weitsman 2004). However, organiza-
TABLE 2 Effects of Alliance Obligations and Provisions on Time Until First Dispute with Selection on
Alliance Formation
Selection-Weibull Model with non-Time-Varying Covariates
Variable Coefficient Std. Error % D in h(t)
Time Until Dispute
Independent Variables
Arbitration Commission 1.152* .279 216.45%
Organization .656* .301 92.71%
Non-aggression -.732* .155 -51.91%
Mediate Disputes -.424 .243 -34.56%
Military Institutionalization -.377* .126 -31.41%
Control Variables
Relative Capabilities -.747 .600 -10.19%
Major Power .885* .289 136.55%
Similarity -.138 .289 -3.72%
Shared Border 1.550* .706 352.67%
Joint Democracy -1.549* .272 -77.91%
Wartime Alliance -.474 .269 -37.00%
Constant -3.190* .302
Number of Episodes 3,056
Number of Failures 135
r (Duration Dependence) .846*
Alliance Formation
Regime Similarity -.005* .001
Major Power .344* .344
Distance -.00009* 3.75 e-06
Strategic Rivalry .529* .052
International Interaction -.549* .084
Similarity .341* .027
External Threat .487* .058
Total Number of Allies i .015* .000
Total Number of Allies j .047* .001
Constant -1.815* .039
Number of Observations 61,164
Chi-square 8,831.41*
rho (Error Correlation) .241*
* = p < .05; in two-tailed tests of statistical significance.
Note: Substantive effects (the change in the hazard rate) in the third column are calculated as eb - 1 for a one unit change in dichotomous
(or categorical) variables and e(b*sd) - 1 where sd is a change of one standard deviation in the Relative Capabilities or Similarity variables.
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tional features—permanent arbitration commissions
and links to political organizations—did not make
alliances more effective in promoting peace between
members. In fact, the association of organizations
with shorter durations of peace runs counter to the
results of Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004).
Future research into the process that leads states to
form military alliances within, or as part of, standing
organizations with permanent bureaucracies and
organizations whose mission is dispute adjudication is
clearly warranted. Perhaps the formation of these alli-
ances is evidence that states are desperate to create
international institutions to resolve their disagree-
ments, but the underlying tension between the
members overpowers the ability of organizations to
generate peaceful settlements. Additional studies
should attempt to identify whether all organizations
are destined to fail at conflict prevention or the par-
ticular design of the organizations is inadequate.
Policymakers and scholars interested in the design
of international institutions for security cooperation
will observe that some “institutionalist” claims can be
supported by our findings. Foreign policy experts may
want to negotiate future alliances that include institu-
tional features to prevent conflict, while maintaining
appropriate skepticism about the capacity of perma-
nent organizations to facilitate peace. For interna-
tional relations scholars, the prevalence of military
alliances in history and their structural variety present
a significant opportunity to test arguments about
institutional efficacy in an issue-area that has been
traditionally considered the domain of realpolitik
arguments. As Lake (1999) argues, the pursuit of
national security involves trade-offs between various
institutional arrangements, of which alliances are only
one option available to states.
Manuscript submitted 26 June 2006
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